Iran Has the Ability to Close the Strait of Hormuz...But Will They?
Let's take a dive into history
I write this, given the rapid escalation of events in June 2025. The US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan represent the most direct American military action against Iran since the 1988 Operation Praying Mantis. Iran’s response through parliamentary threats to close the Strait, combined with continued Israeli strikes on Iranian military assets, creates a volatile situation where miscalculation could have global consequences.
The Strait of Hormuz stands as one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, facilitating the passage of approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day—equivalent to 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption. As tensions between Iran, Israel, and the United States reached unprecedented levels in June 2025, with the US conducting “Operation Midnight Hammer” strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities and Iran’s parliament voting to threaten Strait closure, the international community faces renewed concerns about the security of this vital waterway.
The current crisis represents the most serious threat to the Strait of Hormuz since the 2011-2012 sanctions dispute, when Iran similarly threatened closure but ultimately backed down. However, the 2025 context presents unique dynamics: Iran’s nuclear program has been significantly degraded by Israeli and US strikes, its regional proxy network has been severely weakened following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the battering of Hamas and Hezbollah, and its economy remains under severe sanctions pressure. These factors fundamentally alter the strategic calculus surrounding any potential Iranian attempt to close the Strait.
Iran’s public threats and demonstrated military capabilities, multiple converging factors, make the actual closure of the Strait of Hormuz highly unlikely. The Strait of Hormuz carries not only 20% of global oil trade but also one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade, primarily from Qatar. Any disruption would trigger immediate oil price spikes—analysts predict increases to over $100 per barrel, with some estimates reaching $120-130 per barrel. For Iran, which depends on oil exports for government revenue and whose economy has already been severely weakened by sanctions, the economic costs of closure would be catastrophic.
I ascertain that, while Iran possesses the technical capability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic, economic, and political costs of such action far outweigh any potential benefits, making closure highly improbable despite current tensions
1. Current Geopolitical Context and Iran’s Strategic Position
The June 2025 escalation between Iran, Israel, and the United States has fundamentally altered the regional balance of power, leaving Iran in its weakest strategic position since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The current crisis began with Israel’s systematic campaign against Iranian nuclear facilities and military assets, followed by the unprecedented US “Operation Midnight Hammer” strikes that targeted three key nuclear facilities with over 125 aircraft, including B-2 bombers delivering massive “bunker buster” bombs.
Iran’s strategic position has been severely compromised across multiple dimensions. The loss of Syria as a key ally following the ouster of the Assad regime has eliminated a crucial component of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”. This development has severed Iran’s primary land bridge to Lebanon and its ability to supply Hezbollah, fundamentally altering the regional balance. Simultaneously, Hamas has been significantly degraded following its conflict with Israel, while Hezbollah’s capabilities have been substantially reduced through Israeli operations.
The current Iranian government faces what experts describe as an unprecedented crisis of regime survival. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei’s characterization of the situation as “unprecedentedly dangerous” reflects the regime’s recognition of its vulnerable position. The strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities have not only set back its nuclear program but also demonstrated the vulnerability of Iran’s most sensitive strategic assets to precision attacks.
Iran’s response options are severely constrained by its weakened position. While Iranian officials have threatened retaliation, including parliamentary member Behnam Saeedi’s statement that “closing the Strait of Hormuz is one of the potential options,” these threats must be understood within the context of Iran’s limited strategic alternatives. The regime’s primary concern has shifted from regional expansion to regime survival, fundamentally altering its risk calculus.
The international isolation Iran faces in 2025 is more severe than during previous crises. The European Union has maintained sanctions, while Iran’s primary remaining economic lifeline—oil exports to China—represents a vulnerability rather than a strength. China’s willingness to continue purchasing Iranian oil at discounted rates provides Iran with essential revenue but also creates a dependency that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would immediately sever.
Iran’s military capabilities, while still substantial, have been significantly degraded. Israeli strikes have targeted Iranian missile production facilities, command centers, and military leadership, reducing Iran’s ability to project power regionally. The systematic targeting of Iranian military assets has left the regime with fewer options for escalation that do not risk further devastating retaliation.
The domestic political situation within Iran adds another layer of constraint. The regime faces ongoing internal dissent and economic hardship among the population. Any action that would further damage Iran’s economy or provoke additional international retaliation would risk exacerbating domestic instability. The regime’s survival depends on maintaining some level of economic functionality and avoiding actions that would unite the international community against Iran.
Regional dynamics also work against Iranian escalation. Gulf Arab states, while concerned about the conflict’s escalation, have generally aligned with international efforts to contain Iran. The presence of US military assets in the region, including the Fifth Fleet’s permanent presence in Bahrain, provides a deterrent framework that did not exist during earlier crises. The multinational naval presence in the Persian Gulf creates multiple tripwires that would trigger an immediate international response to any Iranian attempt to close the Strait.
Iran’s strategic communications reveal the constraints it faces. While officials have made threatening statements, they have also emphasized diplomatic solutions and restraint. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi’s scheduled nuclear talks with European counterparts in Geneva demonstrate Iran’s recognition that diplomatic engagement remains preferable to military escalation. This pattern of combining threats with diplomatic outreach reflects Iran’s understanding of its limited options.
The current crisis differs fundamentally from previous confrontations in that Iran lacks the strategic depth and regional support that previously provided it with escalation options. The combination of military degradation, economic vulnerability, regional isolation, and domestic pressure creates a strategic environment where closure of the Strait of Hormuz would represent a catastrophic miscalculation rather than a viable strategic option.
2. Economic Implications and Market Dynamics
The economic dimensions of a potential Strait of Hormuz closure present perhaps the most compelling argument against Iranian action, as the consequences would be catastrophic for Iran’s already fragile economy while triggering global economic disruption that would inevitably provoke massive international retaliation. The Strait’s role as a critical artery for global energy trade creates economic constraints that fundamentally limit Iran’s strategic options.
3. Global Economic Stakes
The Strait of Hormuz facilitates the daily passage of approximately 20 million barrels of oil, representing 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption and up to 30% of global maritime oil trade. This volume has remained relatively stable despite regional tensions, with the Energy Information Administration reporting that flows through the Strait averaged 20 million barrels per day in 2024 and remained flat in the first quarter of 2025. The Strait also handles one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade, primarily from Qatar, making it equally critical for global energy security.
The immediate economic impact of closure would be severe. Oil prices have already demonstrated extreme sensitivity to mere threats of disruption—Brent crude surged from $69 to $74 per barrel in a single day following Iranian threats in June 2025, despite no actual disruption to shipping. Economic analysts predict that actual closure would drive oil prices above $100 per barrel, with Lebanese University Professor Jassem Ajaka estimating a $25 increase “in a single jump—something the global economy is not accustomed to.”
More dramatic projections suggest even higher price spikes. Some analysts predict oil could reach $120-130 per barrel, while Iranian state media has warned of prices spiking to $400 per barrel. These price increases would trigger immediate global inflation, as oil is involved in 95% of other goods through transportation, manufacturing, and raw material extraction. The cascading economic effects would include increased costs for food production, manufacturing, and virtually all economic sectors dependent on energy inputs.
3.1 Iran’s Economic Vulnerabilities
Iran’s own economic dependence on oil exports creates a fundamental constraint against Strait closure. According to the US Energy Information Administration, Iran earned approximately $53 billion in net oil export revenues in 2023, representing a critical component of government finances. Oil exports contributed about 80% of Iranian public revenue during the 2011-2012 sanctions period, and while Iran has attempted to diversify its economy, petroleum exports remain essential for government operations.
Iran’s current oil production capacity of approximately 2.9 million barrels per day, with potential to reach 3.8 million barrels per day if sanctions were lifted, represents the country’s primary source of foreign currency. The bulk of these exports—approximately 2.6 million barrels per day—must transit through the Strait of Hormuz to reach international markets. The closure of the Strait would immediately eliminate Iran’s ability to export oil, cutting off its primary source of government revenue.
The Iranian economy’s vulnerability is compounded by its limited alternative export routes. While Iran has developed the Goreh-Jask pipeline with a capacity of 300,000 barrels per day to bypass the Strait, this represents only a fraction of Iran’s export capacity and has been largely unused, with exports dropping to less than 70,000 barrels per day in 2024 before stopping entirely after September. This limited alternative capacity means Iran would lose the vast majority of its oil export revenue if the Strait were closed.
Iran’s dependence on Chinese oil purchases creates additional constraints. China has become Iran’s primary oil customer, purchasing Iranian crude at discounted rates despite sanctions. This relationship provides Iran with essential revenue but also creates a dependency that Strait closure would immediately sever. China’s willingness to continue these purchases depends on its economic viability, which would be eliminated if Iran’s actions triggered broader international conflict.
3.2 Limited Alternative Routes and Strategic Vulnerabilities
The global oil market’s dependence on the Strait of Hormuz reflects the limited alternative routes available for Persian Gulf oil exports. While some pipeline alternatives exist, their capacity is insufficient to replace Strait transit. Saudi Arabia operates a 5 million barrel per day East-West pipeline that can bypass the Strait, and the UAE has a 1.8 million barrel per day pipeline to Fujairah. However, these alternatives can handle only approximately 2.6 million barrels per day of additional capacity, far short of the 20 million barrels per day that normally transit the Strait.
The inadequacy of alternative routes means that Strait closure would create immediate supply shortages in global oil markets. Asian markets, which receive 84% of crude oil transiting the Strait, would be particularly affected. China, India, Japan, and South Korea—which together account for 69% of all Hormuz crude oil flows—would face immediate supply disruptions that would force them to seek alternative sources at significantly higher prices.
For Iran specifically, the lack of alternative export routes creates a strategic vulnerability that makes Strait closure economically suicidal. Unlike other Persian Gulf producers who have some pipeline alternatives, Iran’s geography and political isolation limit its options. The country’s northern borders with Russia and Central Asia offer limited export potential due to infrastructure constraints and sanctions complications.
3.3 Historical Economic Precedents
Historical analysis of previous Iranian threats provides insight into the economic calculations that have consistently led Iran to avoid actual closure. During the 2011-2012 crisis, Iran threatened Strait closure in response to EU sanctions but ultimately backed down as the economic costs became clear. The EU sanctions that banned Iranian oil exports to Europe, combined with reduced purchases by Asian countries, demonstrated how Iran’s economy could be severely damaged without any need for military action.
The pattern of Iranian behavior during economic crises reveals a consistent prioritization of economic survival over military escalation. Even during the Iran-Iraq War, when Iran had greater strategic justification for aggressive action, the country never completely closed the Strait despite extensive mining and attacks on shipping. The economic costs of complete closure were recognized as too severe even during wartime.
Current economic conditions make Strait closure even less viable than during previous crises. Iran’s economy has been weakened by years of sanctions, currency devaluation, and international isolation. The regime’s survival depends on maintaining some level of economic functionality, making actions that would eliminate oil export revenue particularly dangerous for regime stability.
The economic analysis demonstrates that Iran faces a fundamental strategic dilemma: the very action that might provide maximum leverage against its enemies would simultaneously eliminate its primary source of revenue and trigger economic consequences that would threaten regime survival. This economic logic provides perhaps the strongest constraint against Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz, regardless of military capabilities or political motivations.
4. Military and Strategic Considerations
The military dimensions of a potential Strait of Hormuz closure reveal a complex strategic environment where Iran’s asymmetric capabilities are constrained by overwhelming US naval superiority and the catastrophic consequences of escalation. While Iran possesses demonstrated capabilities to disrupt shipping through mining, missile attacks, and swarm tactics, the military realities strongly favor deterrence over action.
4.1 US Naval Presence and Deterrent Capabilities
The United States maintains a formidable naval presence in the Persian Gulf through the Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Manama, Bahrain, with an area of responsibility encompassing approximately 2.5 million square miles including the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean. This permanent presence provides both a deterrent effect and rapid response capability that fundamentally alters Iran’s strategic calculations.
Current US naval assets in the region include four minesweepers based in Bahrain, each with 100 sailors trained specifically for underwater hazard management. The Navy’s Task Force 56, typically led by a senior explosive ordnance disposal officer, maintains specialized capabilities for mine-clearing operations using advanced technologies including autonomous underwater vehicles that can scan the seafloor with sonar far more efficiently than during previous crises.
Recent US military deployments demonstrate the commitment to maintaining freedom of navigation. The USS Bataan (LHD-5) and USS Carter Hall (LSD-50) entered the Persian Gulf in August 2023 as part of the US response to Iranian harassment of commercial shipping. The presence of multiple aircraft carriers, including recent transits by carrier strike groups, provides overwhelming conventional military superiority that Iran cannot match.
Pentagon officials have acknowledged Iran’s capability to mine the Strait while simultaneously preparing countermeasures. However, these same officials emphasize that any Iranian mining operation would trigger massive military retaliation.
4.2 Iran’s Asymmetric Warfare Capabilities
Iran has developed substantial asymmetric warfare capabilities specifically designed to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) operates a fleet designed around fast attack boats, mine-laying capabilities, and swarm tactics that could potentially disrupt commercial shipping.
Iran’s naval assets include over 18,500 personnel and more than 100 vessels, ranking 37th out of 145 naval forces worldwide according to Global Firepower’s 2024 assessment [43]. The regular Iranian Navy operates modern destroyers including the Zulfiqar, Sahand, and Zagros, along with frigates and a submarine force of 19-27 submarines, including three Tareq-class diesel-electric submarines capable of mine-laying and cruise missile launches.
The IRGC Navy’s asymmetric capabilities are particularly concerning for commercial shipping. Recent enhancements include 110 locally manufactured combat speedboats equipped with missiles and rockets, and in August 2024, Iran received 2,640 missile and drone systems, including cruise missiles described as “untraceable by radars.” These capabilities enable Iran to conduct harassment operations and potentially disrupt shipping through coordinated swarm attacks.
4.3 Historical Military Precedents and Lessons
The 1988 Operation Praying Mantis provides crucial insight into likely US military responses to Iranian aggression in the Strait. When Iran mined the USS Samuel B. Roberts in April 1988, the US Navy responded with a one-day battle that destroyed one Iranian frigate, one gunboat, and up to six armed speedboats while seriously damaging a second frigate. This overwhelming response demonstrated US willingness and capability to retaliate decisively against Iranian naval aggression.
Former US Central Command leader General Joseph Votel and former US naval commander Vice Admiral Kevin M. Donegan have both confirmed Iran’s capability to mine the Strait while emphasizing that such action would “probably invite a massive American military response and further damage Iran’s already crippled economy”. Admiral Donegan specifically noted that “mining also hurts Iran; they would lose income from oil they sell to China”.
The Iran-Iraq War’s “Tanker War” period (1981-1988) provides additional historical context. Despite Iran’s extensive anti-shipping campaign, including the placement of 150 mines in the Strait, Iran never succeeded in closing the waterway. The combined Iranian and Iraqi anti-shipping campaigns disrupted less than 2% of Gulf shipping and failed to significantly impact oil exports or cause sustained price increases.
4.4 Strategic Constraints and Escalation Risks
Iran’s military planners face fundamental strategic constraints that make Strait closure extremely risky. The presence of over 40,000 US troops across the region provides multiple potential targets for Iranian retaliation, but also creates tripwires that would guarantee a massive US response to any Iranian aggression. The Quds Force and militia networks that Iran might use for asymmetric attacks have been significantly degraded by regional partners’ counterterrorism efforts.
The timing and scale of any Iranian military action would be critical factors in determining the international response.
The international legal framework also constrains Iranian options. The Strait of Hormuz is recognized as an international waterway under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and any attempt to close it would violate international maritime law. This legal framework provides justification for international military intervention to restore freedom of navigation.
5. Historical Precedents and Patterns of Iranian Behavior
Historical analysis of Iranian behavior regarding the Strait of Hormuz reveals a consistent pattern of threatening closure while ultimately avoiding action, providing crucial insights into likely Iranian decision-making during the current crisis. This pattern demonstrates that Iranian threats serve primarily as diplomatic leverage rather than genuine strategic intent, constrained by the same economic and military factors that operate today.
5.1 The Tanker War and Iran’s Strategic Learning
The Iran-Iraq War’s maritime component, known as the Tanker War (1981-1988), represents the most extensive Iranian military operations in the Strait of Hormuz and provides essential lessons about Iranian strategic behavior. During this period, Iran conducted 168 attacks on merchant vessels compared to Iraq’s 283 attacks, demonstrating significant anti-shipping capabilities while revealing the limitations of such strategies.
Iran’s tactics during the Tanker War included the use of Chinese-made Silkworm cruise missiles, speedboat harassment of tankers, and extensive mining operations. In 1988, Iran planted 150 mines throughout the Strait, representing the most serious attempt to disrupt navigation in the waterway’s modern history. However, despite these extensive operations, Iran never succeeded in closing the Strait to commercial traffic.
The strategic outcomes of the Tanker War were ultimately counterproductive for Iran. The campaign resulted in over 400 civilian seamen being killed and hundreds of merchant ships damaged, but it failed to achieve Iran’s strategic objectives. More significantly, the mining operations that struck the USS Samuel B. Roberts in April 1988 triggered Operation Praying Mantis, in which US forces destroyed substantial Iranian naval assets in a single day.
The Tanker War’s conclusion provides crucial insights into Iranian strategic learning. The shift in the balance of forces resulting from US involvement was one of the key factors forcing Iran to cease hostilities in 1988. This experience demonstrated to the Iranian leadership that escalation in the Strait inevitably triggers international intervention that Iran cannot successfully resist.
5.2 The 2011-2012 Sanctions Crisis
The 2011-2012 Strait of Hormuz dispute provides the most relevant historical precedent for current Iranian behavior, as it involved similar economic pressures and international sanctions. The crisis began on December 27, 2011, when Iranian Vice President Mohammad-Reza Rahimi threatened to close the Strait in response to EU and US sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports.
Iran’s threats during this period were accompanied by significant military posturing, including the Velayat 90 naval exercise—a 10-day military operation in international waters near the Strait. Iranian Army Chief of Staff General Ataollah Salehi warned the United States not to redeploy the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis to the Persian Gulf, while Iranian lawmakers prepared legislation to bar foreign naval vessels from entering the Persian Gulf without Iranian permission.
The international response was swift and decisive. A coalition including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Australia deployed a multinational flotilla to the Persian Gulf, with the UK sending the advanced Type 45 destroyer HMS Daring and the US maintaining two aircraft carrier strike groups in the region. This overwhelming naval presence demonstrated international commitment to maintaining freedom of navigation.
The economic context of the 2011-2012 crisis reveals the constraints that ultimately led Iran to back down. Oil exports contributed approximately 80% of Iranian public revenue at the time, with roughly 20% being exported to Europe. The EU sanctions implemented on January 23, 2012, banned Iranian oil exports to Europe and froze Iranian assets, while Asian countries including Japan and South Korea agreed to reduce their Iranian oil imports.
Iran’s ultimate decision not to follow through on closure threats demonstrates the power of economic constraints. Despite extensive military preparations and public threats, Iran recognized that closure would eliminate its primary source of government revenue while triggering massive international retaliation. The pattern established during this crisis—threats followed by diplomatic engagement and strategic retreat—provides a template for understanding current Iranian behavior.
5.3 Subsequent Threats and Consistent Patterns
Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz have continued periodically since 2012, consistently following the same pattern of escalatory rhetoric followed by strategic restraint. In 2018, amid renewed US sanctions under the Trump administration, Iranian officials again threatened Strait closure but took no action. Similarly, in April 2019, Iran warned that it would block maritime traffic through the Strait if barred from using it, but these threats were not implemented .
The consistency of this pattern across different Iranian administrations and varying international circumstances suggests that the constraints against closure are structural rather than situational. Commodore Alireza Tangsiri, head of the IRGC Navy, has repeatedly stated that closing the Strait would be “easy” for Iran, yet the country has never attempted such action despite numerous provocations.
Expert analysis consistently identifies the gap between Iranian capabilities and intentions. The Congressional Research Service noted in 2018 that “Iranian officials regularly threaten to ‘close the Strait of Hormuz’ but have never acted on this threat”. This pattern reflects Iranian recognition that while the country possesses the technical capability to disrupt shipping, the strategic costs far outweigh any potential benefits.
Conclusion
The historical record demonstrates that Iranian leadership has consistently recognized the catastrophic consequences of actually closing the Strait of Hormuz. Each crisis has reinforced the lesson that threats provide diplomatic leverage while actual closure would trigger economic and military consequences that Iran cannot survive.
Current Iranian strategic communications reflect this historical learning. While officials have made threatening statements about Strait closure, they have simultaneously emphasized diplomatic solutions and restraint. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi’s participation in scheduled nuclear talks with European counterparts demonstrates Iran’s continued preference for diplomatic engagement over military escalation.
The pattern of Iranian behavior suggests that current threats should be understood within this historical context. Iran’s parliamentary vote to threaten Strait closure represents an escalation of rhetoric designed to increase diplomatic pressure, but the same structural constraints that have prevented closure in previous crises remain operative and have actually intensified due to Iran’s weakened strategic position.
Historical analysis reveals that Iran has learned from previous confrontations that escalation in the Strait of Hormuz inevitably triggers international responses that Iran cannot successfully resist. This strategic learning, combined with Iran’s current vulnerabilities, makes actual closure highly unlikely despite continued threatening rhetoric.